The authors analyzed the role of Performance Related Pay (PRP) in a sample of Italian manufacturing and service firms and presented standard quantile estimates to investigate heterogeneity in pay-performance impacts on labor productivity and wages. In a second stage, the endogeneity of PRP was taken into account by using instrumental variable quantile regression techniques. They find considerable heterogeneity across the distribution of labor productivity and wages, with the highest role of PRP obtained at the lowest and highest quantiles. However, for all quantiles, the comparison of productivity and wage estimates suggests that PRP might not only be rent-sharing devices, but also incentive schemes that substantially lead to efficiency enhancements. These findings are confirmed for firms under union governance and suggest that well designed policies, that circumvent the limited implementation of PRP practices, would guarantee productivity improvement.
Introduction
In the last few years, there has been a trend towards decentralization of wage setting, associated with the increasing use of variable pays to provide an important element of flexibility and closer links to individual or collective performance. However, this trend has shown great variability across EU economies and the number of contributions using nationally representative sample surveys to estimate the productivity effects of these agreements is still low. Furthermore, econometric studies have mainly focused only on the incentive effects of such schemes, whereas the question of whether employees benefit financially from performance related pay (PRP) has never been satisfactorily resolved.
Highlighting the incentive experience in Italy would be particularly worthwhile because prior works for this country have been restricted to large companies or selected sectors (Origo, 2009 ). In addition, not only has the efficiency performance been disappointing in the Italian economy, but also large drops have been recorded in the share of income accruing to salaried employees. We intend to analyze the drivers of this evidence and test whether the insufficient room given in decentralized bargaining to PRP has affected the efficiency and distributive patterns recorded in Italian enterprises.
We also focus on a relevant feature: the quality of industrial relations, represented by the presence of unions. The impact exerted by unions depends on their influence on promoting more efficient management, through their 'voice' function, but also on extracting union wage premiums, as predicted by monopoly union bargaining models. This seems relevant in a highly unionized economy, such as the Italian case, and particularly important because, up to now, international evidence shows contradictory findings and the effects of unions on pay settings and productivity are still ambiguous. These uncertain results require the attention of the researches aimed at verifying the role of workers' representation in the PRP experience.
We present OLS estimates but also address the question of the heterogeneity of firms with quantile regressions, whereas most studies have estimated PRP bonuses and union wage premiums focusing exclusively on conditional mean models. Thus, by adopting quantile regression techniques, we examine the heterogeneity of PRP effects over whole productivity and wage distributions. Finally, we consider the endogeneity of the firm's decision to adopt PRP, a choice that may depend in part on factors that influence productivity and wages, so 3 that assuming exogeneity of PRP may give biased estimates. Therefore, to gain robustness, we have validated quantile results by instrumental variable estimates.
We use a unique dataset for the Italian economy obtained from the ISFOL Employer and Employee Surveys (2005, 2007, 2010 ) which collect information at firm level for both the manufacturing and services sectors and enterprises of all sizes. This rich dataset allows us to explore the relationship between PRP and labor productivity (and wages), but also to control for an ample set of covariates 1 .
Related literature
One of the key characteristics of compensation systems concerns fixed or variable payments, i.e. payments linked to worker input or to worker performance (Lazear, 1995) . The properties of these alternative options are still under debate since up to now neither of these payment types produces universally superior results (Belfield and Marsden 2003) . We offer additional evidence by focussing on output-based pay, such as PRP, that may be individual or collective.
Pay settings that change from rewards based on input measures to payments related to output outcomes may induce dramatic improvements in production, which may be explained by two factors that have equal impacts. The first is that this policy attracts workers of greater ability (Lazear, 2000) . The second is that contingent contracts are effective in contexts in which output (but not effort) is observable by the employer because such contracts encourage more effort and mitigate the agency problem (Prendergast, 1999) .
However, controversial aspects arise from the possible trade-off between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations since contingent rewards may conflict with intrinsic motivation, thus impairing performance (Benabou and Tirole, 2003) . For instance, Bandiera et al. (2010) examine the importance of social ties among workers and find positive spill-over effects where social ties exist, as a given worker's productivity is significantly higher when that person works together with friends, especially those who are more able. In order to motivate workers, firms may, therefore, choose to exploit social incentives as an alternative to monetary incentives. 1 The determinants of decentralized bargaining and of the bargaining covering PRP have been estimated on the basis of the ISFOL surveys for 2005 and 2007 by Damiani and Ricci (forthcoming) .
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Economic theory is also ambiguous as to the expected impact of PRP in the form of collective bonuses on productivity. These bonuses, such as profit sharing, favor better teamwork, greater workforce cooperation in facing new technology and organizational changes, and these collective incentive schemes are more likely to be offered when total output is the result of the efforts of many agents and individual contributions cannot easily be identified (Holmstrom, 1979; FitzRoy and Kraft, 1992) . In such cases, the absence of group incentives may lead to inferior Nash equilibria, associated with low levels of productivity due to limited cooperation. By contrast, employees who participate in enterprise results "will become more committed to the goals of that enterprise, leading to improvements in individual and organizational performance. At a wider societal level, financial participation may be seen as a tool for redistribution of income and wealth, and may therefore serve as a broader instrument for social integration" (Pendleton et al. 2001, p.1) .
However, collective bonuses may induce employees to free ride on the efforts of others and cut productivity. In such circumstances, group incentives may lead to decentralized monitoring due to peer pressure and shame norms (Kandel and Lazear, 1992) , thus mitigating opportunistic behavior. Along these lines, Mas and Moretti (2009) find that workers whose efforts may be noticed by their fellows display more cooperative attitudes. Negative externalities (which are pervasive in workplaces) are thus internalized, not because of altruistic behavior but because peer pressure discourages free-riding, especially when workers expect that many future interactions with the same peers will occur.
The positive productivity effects of collective PRP have been tested in a number of recent studies (Gielen, Kerkhofs and Van Ours, 2009; Kruse, Freeman and Blasi, 2010; Kato, Lee and Ryu, 2012) . What deserve closer attention are the main impacts of PRP on wage setting.
In decentralized wage bargaining, workers, through PRP, can appropriate a large part of the rents generated by their firms. One interpretation of the positive wage premium negotiated in firm-level contracts is that of rent sharing. This phenomenon may be relevant when specific human capital is important and there is "a match-specific surplus (rent), created by the costs of finding new partners, and this surplus will have to be shared by bargaining" (Acemoglu and Piscke, 1999, p. F121 ). By using firm-level data some authors show a robust positive association between wages and profitability (see, among others, Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; 5 5 Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfey, 1996) . This evidence has been confirmed by introducing controls for unobserved worker heterogeneities (Gurtzen, 2008; Martins, 2009 ).
However, how many of these wage effects are due to the presence of unions is still uncertain. It can be argued that trade unions have sufficient bargaining power to obtain high wage premiums with firm-level agreements even in the absence of PRP schemes (Booth and Frank, 1999) . By contrast, it has been found that unionized plants are more likely to utilize incentive payments, also accompanied by joint decision-making, that lead to better results in terms of firm performance (Black and Lynch, 2001 (Bryson and Forth, 2010) . This means that in unionized firms, constructive institutional responses overcome free rider problems of group incentives, increase workers' commitment and reduce voluntary labor turnover (Booth and Chatterji, 1998 ).
We will address these issues in the econometric section. 
Data and descriptive statistics Data

Descriptive statistics
Italy is characterized by a two-tiered bargaining regime, where the first-level wage contracts are linked to the target inflation rate and decentralized bargaining should distribute wage premiums linked to productivity or firm results. However, the implementation of decentralized bargaining has been modest. As shown by to 10% in 2010, and the share of immigrants, on total employees, declined from 9% to 5%.
The overall weakness in productivity and wage growth of sample firms may be related to the decreasing share of innovative and exporting units. Firms that originated new products declined from 55% to 45%, whereas the proportion of exporters slumped from 41% to 31%, from 2005 to 2010.
It is worth noting that information on lagged sales volatility, used as instrument for PRP
(1 when this volatility is higher than the median sample value and 0 otherwise), is available only for a restricted sub-sample of firms (about 3,000 observations per year). This means that by performing the instrumental variable regressions we made a double robustness check.
First, we took into account endogeneity and second we performed estimates on a different, more restricted sample of firms.
According to expectations, small-size firms prevail and the largest share of firms is mainly located in Northern Italy. In particular, firms with less than 50 employees are more than 80%
while those with more than 250 employees, in each year considered, are about 5% of the total sample. Finally the RIL-AIDA data indicate that firms were mainly specialized in manufacturing sectors and less present in services, with the exception of the trade sector.
These differentials in sector and territorial localization of PRP Italian firms, as well as in various characteristics of workforce composition, show the importance of our unique data and of its wide coverage.
[Insert show that there is higher probability to find PRP firms among those with higher values of labor productivity and wages. As shown by Figure 1 , the distribution referring to PRP firms is slightly placed to the right of that concerning other firms. This difference is recorded in the whole sample and is confirmed in the restricted sample that includes only unionized firms.
These first comparisons encouraged us to further explore the existence of possible relations between PRP schemes and enterprise performance.
[Insert Figure 1] Econometric strategy
In this section we present the empirical strategy we used to estimate the effect of PRP on labor productivity and wages. In particular, the relationship between labor productivity and PRP may be formalized by a production function augmented by a dummy variable capturing the incidence of PRP and inserting a set of other controls for firm characteristics and workforce composition. The following equation was estimated:
(1) ( ) ( ) where ( ) is the (log of) valued added per employee, is the (log of) physical capital per employee, PRP represents a dummy variable indicating the presence of PRP and the vector F it denotes controls for characteristics at firm level and workforce composition. The parameter  s denotes sector specific fixed effects,  j regional (NUTS1_level) fixed effects for macro-areas, represents year fixed effects and is the error term capturing the idiosyncratic component of labor productivity.
The wage equation parallels the productivity equation (1). Thus, we estimate the following equation:
where the dependent variable represents the (log of) the average annual wages (W) per employee (L), while the explanatory variables are the same included in equation (1).
We started with a pooled cross section analysis of equations (1) and (2), controlling for time fixed effects. We preferred a pooled sample because we had an unbalanced panel dataset, with a different number of observations for each year. In any case, a pooled OLS estimator does not allow us to take into account heterogeneity across firms. For this reason, besides OLS estimates, we performed a conditional quantile regression to study the effect of PRP along the labor productivity and wage distributions.
First of all, we started with the classical Koenker and Basset (1978) estimator:
where is the coefficient of interest, is a vector of coefficients for all control variables that now are included in the matrix , is the quantile 0.1; 0.5; 0.9, is the asymmetric loss function ( )
As known, the OLS estimator fits a linear model for the dependent variables ( ) and ( ) by minimizing the expected squared error. The quantile regression (QR) fits a linear model for the same dependent variables using the asymmetric loss function ( ) and minimizing the least-absolute deviations. When , we have the conditional median, the loss function is symmetric and this expectation function minimizes the least absolute deviations. For ( ) , the loss function weights positive and negative terms, asymmetrically. This means, for example, that if then much more weight is placed on prediction for observations ( ) than for observations ( ) .
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For labor productivity and wages we estimated three different quantile regressions simultaneously, with . In addition, we addressed heteroskedasticity by means of bootstrap standard errors that assume independence over observations (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009) . The QR approach is more robust to outliers and provides information about the relationships between PRP and the dependent variables at different points of their conditional distribution.
However, the Koenker and Basset (1978) estimator does not allow us to distinguish between casual effects and spurious correlation between PRP and productivity or wages, that will typically arise if more productive firms or firms that pay higher wages more likely adopt PRP schemes. Thus, if there are unobserved factors influencing the adoption of PRP, the estimated effect on productivity and wages will be biased. To avoid that these relationships remain obscured, the issue of endogeneity has to be taken into account. The binary nature of our key explanatory variable (PRP) led us to handle endogeneity within the context of the treatment effect techniques. As we will discuss below, in two out of the three instrumental variable quantile methods used in our estimates, we compared the performance of both treated firms (firms adopting PRP scheme) and the control group (firms that have not adopted PRP schemes), whose outcomes permit having a counterfactual analysis. The volatility of sales at the firm level, recorded in years before 2005 (over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] 3 , may be a valid instrument because it is a proxy of uncertainty. This variable is expected to randomly affect the sample firms, but at the same time also influences the probability that firms introduce PRP schemes as an incentive device. Indeed, in the Italian two-tiered bargaining regime, firms may distribute PRP wage premiums linked to firm results, at the second level of bargaining. This wage component is added to the base wage, set in the first level, and could be zero when firms do not gain positive results. Thus, also risk-averse employees will be no reluctant to accept these agreements, because these variable pays add on in years of success, but do not cause any reduction in the (first level) base pay during unsuccessful years. Employees do not take any extra-risks, whereas firms, on their part, especially if they experienced a high degree of volatility in the past, would be more willing to adopt PRP schemes as a strategy to obtain higher employee performance and successful outcomes. First of all, the last two methods are based on a binary endogenous variable and a binary instrument. Thus, we transformed the past sales volatility of the firm into a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the firm experienced a volatility higher than the median volatility recorded by the others, and 0 otherwise. The IVQR_2LAD estimator consists in using the fitted values, obtained from a first step, in a standard quantile regression, performed in a second step, where the instrumented key variable (PRP) is introduced as a covariate. In our case, the first step is a probit regression of PRP (our endogenous binary variable) on the binary instrument (sales volatility) at the firm level.
where SV is the binary instrument for volatility of sales, X the firm level controls mentioned above.
The fitted value of PRP was then inserted in the standard quantile regressions (4) and (5). In order to obtain consistent standard errors, we bootstrapped them in both the first stage and the second stage regressions (Arias, 2001; Bosio, 2009 variables. Furthermore, the causal effect is identified only for the sub-population of compliers. In our case, the compliers are firms whose estimated probability to adopt a PRP scheme is correlated to the higher estimated probability of having experienced a past volatility of sales above the median. These compliers are, in our sample, about 72% of all firms adopting PRP 4 .
Following Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002) , the conditional quantile treatment effect for compliers can be estimated consistently by the following weighted quantile regressions: ) where the weights combine the endogenous variable and the instrument 5 . As stated above, the instrument is assumed to hit the sample firms randomly, and the conditional probability to have a volatility above the median, ( | ) has been estimated by means of a non-parametric regression, by using the local logit estimation suggested by However, also in the Frölich and Melly approach the causal effect is identified only for compliers, according to the following estimator:
( ) where are the weights suggested by Frölich and Melly (2010; 2013b) . This regression corresponds to a bivariate quantile regression in which is identified only for PRP=1
observations, and only for PRP=0 observations. In this case the covariates are inserted only in the weights , but not in the second stage equations (9) and (10). In addition, these weights simultaneously balance the distribution of the covariates between treated and non-treated compliers, whereas do not, because they refer to a conditional model.
Lastly, also in this case the probability that a firm experienced a volatility of sales above the median ( | ), has been estimated by means of a non-parametric local logit approach.
Estimation results: OLS and standard Quantile estimates
In this section we present OLS (equations 1 and 2) and standard QR estimates (equations 3 and 4) for labor productivity and wages. These estimates are obtained by including time, sector and regional (NUTS) dummies to control for time-varying, sector-specific factors, as well as geographical disparities which likely influence the dependent variables and cannot be captured by other controls included in our analysis.
Due to multicollinearity problems, we cannot introduce the firm size as regressor. Notice, however, that we find a high correlation between export and innovation propensities, on the one hand, and firm size on the other, in line with results of other studies on Italian firms (see Hall et al. 2009 ). This evidence led us to consider export and innovation propensities as good proxies of the firm size 6 .
[Insert Table 2] [Insert Table 3] The first columns of Table 2 and Table 3 report the labor productivity and wage estimates obtained for the whole sample of firms and the remaining columns those for unionized firms.
OLS findings indicate that the coefficient of PRP is positive and significant and analogous results have been obtained by replicating our estimation strategy for unionized firms. This means that adopting PRP fosters, on average, both labor productivity and wages.
The standard QT estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3 confirm that our key explanatory variable shows a positive and significant effect (almost always at the 1% level of significance) at all quantiles. However, the differences in coefficients associated with PRP across the labor productivity and wage distributions signal that heterogeneity matters. The OLS and median regression coefficients (=0.5) for labor productivity are very similar (9.4% and 9.6%, respectively). Analogously, similar coefficients are found for wage estimates (11.8% and 10.9%, for OLS and median coefficients, respectively). However, these results change remarkably at the tails of the distribution. In particular, we obtain that PRP has a much greater positive impact at the lower conditional quantile (=0.1) of both labor productivity and wage distributions. These differences are confirmed also for the sample of unionized firms, highlighting that PRP schemes are particularly significant for enterprises facing difficulties in terms of efficiency, independently from the presence or not of unions.
From the specification adopted for OLS and standard QR, most of the control variables show the expected sign. First, we find the significant and positive role of the capital stock per capita in labor productivity and wage equations. Second, concerning workforce characteristics, we obtain the negative coefficient of fixed-term workers on labor productivity, accompanied by a parallel penalization of these precarious workers in terms of wages (see Table 3 ). The QR analysis reveals some evidence of heterogeneity also for this variable, with negative and significant coefficients of fixed-term workers along the whole productivity and wage distributions, but with a magnitude, in absolute value, that decreases at higher conditional quantiles. The higher coefficient for the lower tail of the distribution suggests that, especially in low performer firms that use temporary contracts as a cost cut strategy, these forms of job instability reduces investment in training and workers' motivations and, in the end, deteriorate productivity prospects (Blanchard and Landier 2002) .
In best performer firms, on the contrary, temporary contracts may also represent a screening device to select new employees. Thus, these arrangements may induce motivation and effort from those workers who, after the probation period, are interested in obtaining permanent positions, with the result that this incentive effect partially counterbalances the negative impact due to uncertainty and job instability.
Other workers' characteristics, such as employment positions, play a role. The coefficient associated with white-and blue-collar workers, with respect to the omitted category, the executives, are negative and significant, mainly at the highest conditional quantile. A plausible interpretation is that managerial employees have a positive and significant influence on productivity, especially in better performing firms. Among other factors, this may be due to their providing better-designed pay schemes to induce optimal effort from their subordinates.
Another interesting finding is the strong negative coefficient associated with the percentage of women, across the whole productivity and wage distribution. A cautionary interpretation is necessary, since the percentage of women is very likely to be correlated with unobserved (or omitted) firm characteristics. In addition, the negative coefficients associated with the female component are likely to be related to the gender wage gap. Our wage estimates seem to confirm that lower productivity increases, obtained when the proportion of women is higher, is at least partially related to less generous remunerations offered to women. This is in line with other studies that find that female employees, on average, prefer activities that allow a larger flexibility between job and family, have lower interdependence with other workers, are less involved in participative work forms (Zwick, 2004) , and appear less respondent to incentives.
For firm characteristics related to internationalization, our results indicate that the coefficients associated with the propensity to export are positive and significant, but lower at the highest quantiles and for the subsample of unionized firms. This provides evidence that productivity gains of exporters are more important for firms at the lower tail of the efficiency and wage distribution, probably because, under international competition, especially low performer firms are induced to catching up processes.
The control for multinational enterprises (MNEs), on the contrary, plays a significant role only at the 90 th percentile, but is not significant across all quantiles in unionized firms. As discussed above, these international variables are highly correlated with the firm's size and thus, indirectly provide a control for the firms' size.
Estimation results: instrumental variable quantile regressions
The possible endogeneity of PRP deserves further attention. The exogeneity assumption of PRP might be violated if firms adopt this reward system on the basis of productivity performance. In other terms, enterprises with PRP might have already been more efficient (and may have offered higher rewards) than firms that do not have a scheme, before its adoption. This problem, due to the fact that better managed firms tend to adopt PRP, is taken into account by carrying out instrumental variable estimates.
As discussed above, in the section dedicated to the econometric strategy, we attempted to recover the random assignment of PRP (that is our treatment variable) by means of another binary variable such as past sales volatility. The volatility of sales at the firm level, recorded in the years before 2005 (2002-2004 ) is a proxy of uncertainty faced by firms, and it is not expected to be correlated with current values of labor productivity and wages, but correlated with the probability that firms introduce PRP schemes as incentive devices 7 .
The results, obtained by using different estimators and using the past values of volatility of sales at firm level as instrument, are shown in Table 4 . It must be recalled that this instrumental variable was not available for all the firms we considered in the standard QR (see 7 Besides the reasons discussed in the previous section, it must be remarked that among the rationales behind the choice of our instrument, one may recall some results of the strategic management and sales management literatures. For instance, the use of an incentive plan is positively related to a dimension of organizational performance, such as sales volatility, as found by Menguc and Barkers (2003) . Other arguments related to the correlation between variable pay and profit volatility are offered by Burke and Hsieh (2006) . Tables 2 and 3) , hence the number of observations considerably reduces and performing estimates for a more restricted sample of firms represents an additional robustness check.
In order to make the comparison of different approaches readable, we report outcomes uniformed to IVQR_FM estimates that do not include control variables in the second stage.
Thus, Table 4 reports only coefficients and standard errors for our variable of interest, PRP 8 .
As done with previous estimates, for each dependent variable we ran two specifications, the first for the whole sample and the second for the unionized firms.
[Insert Table 4 ]
Columns a, b and c of Table 4 show the results of the traditional IVQR_2LAD of Amemya (1982) and basically confirm a positive and significant impact of PRP along all distributions of both labor productivity and wages. As explained above, this estimator could not be consistent if the composite error is asymmetric (Wooldridge, 2010); in any case, it can be a useful benchmark because it allows the relationship between the instrument (volatility of sales) and the endogenous variable (PRP) to be observed directly in the first stage, as we formalized in equation 5. The results of the probit regression, shown in the appendix (Table   A. 2), highlight that high sales volatility (SV=1) positively influences the probability to adopt a PRP scheme, as we hypothesized above.
Columns d, e and f of Table 4 show the PRP coefficients estimated with the instrumental variable conditional quantile treatment effect of Abadie et al. (2002) . These results confirm those of standard QR (Tables 2 and 3 ) in terms of positive and heterogeneous coefficients associated to PRP along productivity and wage distributions. It is worth noting that, like standard QR, the PRP scheme shows a greater impact on low performers (firms at the bottom of the productivity and wage distributions) in three out of four specifications (the only exception is labor productivity for all firms, reported in the first rows). According to the literature (Wooldridge, 2010; Frölich and Melly, 2010; 2013b) , the IVQR_AAI estimator is much more reliable than the IVQR_2LAD one, even though the causal relationship between PRP and dependent variables is identified only for compliers, namely firms with high sale volatility (SV=1) that adopt PRP (about 72% of total firms adopting PRP, in our case).
Probably the characteristics of this method, applied to more restricted sample, justify the differences with respect to the standard QR results. Indeed in all IVQR_AAI estimates, we found a 'U shaped' relationship between PRP and dependent variables (the magnitude of coefficients decreases, moving from the lowest quantile to the median quantile, and increases again at the 90 th quantile).
The instrumental variable unconditional quantile regression of Frölich and Melly (2010; 2013b) is reported in the last 3 columns of Table 4 . These results basically confirm those obtained with the IVQR_AAI approach, thus PRP coefficients are always positive and significant, but also show a "U shaped" behavior in moving from the bottom to the upper tail of both productivity and wage distributions. This means that PRP exerts greater positive influence for companies lagging behind in terms of productivity and wages. The different interpretation that unconditional quantile regression needs (Frölich and Melly, 2010, p.429) , also in this case justifies the differences in the magnitude of coefficients.
On the whole, the results of Table 4 deserve further attention in terms of distributive implications. First, the comparison of the coefficients of PRP on labor productivity and wages unambiguously shows that the impacts on remunerations are lower than those recorded for labor productivity. Indeed, at least in our sample period, PRP schemes contributed to temperate unit labor costs because the workers did not fully appropriate productivity gains.
Second, the role of unions, far from reversing these general patterns, amplify the positive gap between labor efficiency and wages, since workers' representatives do not exert their bargaining power to obtain additional premiums above-productivity gains. This finding is clearly observable in Figure 2 , where the effects of PRP on labor productivity and wage distributions have been calculated with the instrumental variable unconditional quantile regression of Frölich and Melly (2010; 2013b) for all deciles (from 0.10 to 0.90). This result is a confirmation that in the years of progressive decline in trade union membership and diffusion of precarious working conditions, the objective function of unions has been more oriented to wage moderation to preserve job positions. Thus, employees' representatives have exerted their bargaining power to moderate wage demands, as also shown for other country experiences (Dumont et al. 2005 ).
Finally, notice that all these estimates are obtained with specifications that control for firm characteristics (capital accumulation, firm innovation strategies, internationalization, merger policies), occupation characteristics (employment positions, typology of contracts, gender characteristics), macro-region and industry dummies.
Summing up, the quantile treatment effects estimates obtained with different estimators confirm and complement the previous findings reported in Tables 2 and 3 .
Conclusions
The major finding of our study is that performance-related pay (PRP) may significantly stimulate efficiency gains and thus the limited implementation of these wage practices has played a role in explaining the disappointing Italian results. Concerning distributive aspects, we estimated the role of these agreements on wages to ascertain whether employees benefit financially from PRP, an issue that deserves attention because the existing empirical evidence is still insufficient to infer definite results. From the comparison of productivity and wage estimates, we obtained information indicating that PRP might not only be rent-sharing devices, but also incentive schemes that substantially lead to efficiency enhancements. These findings, obtained for a large sample of manufacturing and service firms in which we controlled for a complete set of covariates, provide useful insights for the Italian economy, whereas prior works for this country have been restricted to large companies, selected sectors or particular areas of the country.
We also considered another debated issue concerning the quality of industrial relations, represented by the presence of unions, whose importance, according to international evidence, is still ambiguous. In fact, their presence may minimize free-riding and promote collaborative attitudes, but their attitudes, in favor of (or adverse to) PRP schemes, remain ambiguous, and empirically there is no clear evidence whether unions increase or decrease incentive effects of PRP agreements, as reviewed in Hirsch (2007).
For Italian enterprises, we conclude that unions not only extract wage premiums for their workers, as predicted by monopoly union bargaining models, but through their 'voice' function, may counter-balance negative side-effects of collective PRP, such as free-riding.
Overall, the estimates suggest that workers' organizations play a redistributive function that is not detrimental to an efficiency-enhancing role. All these findings were supported by a number of robustness checks, taking into account the heterogeneity of firms along the 20 20 productivity and wage distributions by means of quantile regressions. We found significant differences and the highest incidence of PRP on productivity and wages at low and high quantiles of their distribution, also including corrections for biases due to endogeneity of PRP.
Concerning policy implications, we suggest that the adoption of measures that circumvent the limited implementation of PRP practices should be implemented, since payments by results, rather than being only distributive devices, may substantially lead to efficiency enhancements, and the effectiveness of this strategy is not weakened under union governance.
Future research will allow us to more thoroughly explore firms' heterogeneity. Additional statistical information will permit us to explore the role of individual and collective variable payment schemes on the basis of an even more complete dataset and to thoroughly evaluate their different influence on efficiency gains and redistribution inside heterogeneous Italian firms.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
All Firms Unionized Firms
Note: the plots of PRP coefficients refer to all deciles of labor productivity and wage distributions (from the 1 th to the 9 th ). All these coefficients are significant at 1% or 5% level. More detailed information concerning these estimations are available upon request. Notes: The instrument of PRP is a binary variable indicating high sales volatility at the firm level. If standard deviation of the [2002] [2003] [2004] sales is higher than the median standard deviation of the sample the binary variable equals 1, otherwise it is 0. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level.
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